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Abstract We argue that in order to achieve climate justice, 
recognition needs to be given more attention in climate research, 
discourse, and policies. Through the analysis of three examples, 
we identify formal and discursive recognition as central types of 
recognition in climate issues, and we show how powerful actors 
exercise their power in ways that cause climate injustice through 
formal and discursive misrecognition of poor and vulnerable 
groups. The three examples discussed are climate mitigation 
through forest conservation (REDD), the Great Green Wall 
project in Sahel, and the narrative about climate change as a 
contributing factor to the Syrian war.
Keywords climate justice, recognition, REDD+, Great Green Wall, 
afforestation, Tanzania, Sahel, Syria, climate–conflict–migration 
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1 Introduction
Recognition has so far received modest attention in leading 
discourses and policies related to climate change mitigation 
including in the academic literature. In the 1990s, a radical justice 
tradition emerged in political philosophy inspired by recognition 
theory rooted in the ideas of Enlightenment philosophers such as 
Kant, Fichte, and Hegel. This new approach to justice theory had 
mainly a focus on distributive justice and recognition, and with 
procedural justice later added as a third element (Honneth 1995; 
Fraser 1999; Fraser and Honneth 2003; Fraser 2009).
Influenced by this approach to justice, Schlosberg (2003) 
introduced the three elements as key aspects of environmental 
justice, which has become a dominant approach to the field 
(Svarstad and Benjaminsen 2020). Previously, Rawls’ focus on 
distributive justice (Rawls 1971) had been an important source of 
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inspiration for environmental justice scholars in addition to more 
critical approaches (e.g. Pulido 1996; Pellow 2002).
During the last few years, particular attention has been given to 
dimensions of recognition in environmental justice (e.g. Martin et al. 
2016; Bétrisey, Bastiaensen and Mager 2018; Fraser 2018). However, 
as a thematic sub-field of environmental justice, climate justice 
scholarship has still devoted modest attention to recognition, 
despite a few important exceptions (e.g. Hordequin 2016; 
Kortetmäki 2016; Chu and Michael 2018; Preston and Carr 2018). 
The lack of attention to recognition in climate justice can perhaps 
be explained by the fact that it may appear as a more complex 
and less straightforward form of justice than distribution (who gets 
what) and procedure (who decides and how), with both its formal 
and discursive aspects as discussed further in Section 2.
Climate justice research, politics, and practice have primarily 
focused on unfair distribution of consequences of climate change 
or of climate mitigation actions as well as on who is involved in 
decision-making on climate change action. Such distributive and 
procedural climate justice has both a temporal and a spatial 
side. While temporal climate justice emphasises justice for coming 
generations, spatial climate justice concerns the distribution of 
burdens among people today, and with a particular concern for 
people who live in poverty in the global South (Svarstad 2021).
We argue in this article that recognition should also be a key 
element of justice in climate justice. Besides being an important 
aim for justice in itself, recognition is necessary in order to 
obtain distributive and procedural justice. Actors affected by 
climate change or mitigation measures should be recognised 
as participants in formal decision-making, and their situations, 
perspectives, and participations should also be recognised as 
crucial in the discourses framing climate policies and laws.
We argue that lack of both formal and discursive recognition 
constitutes injustice. Such exclusion also disguises causation 
and off-tracks from more effective solutions. A major way 
misrecognition takes place in climate mitigation policies is through 
the elaboration of leading discourses on climate mitigation 
measures in a non-inclusive fashion. Leading discourses are social 
constructions, which also influence policies and practices. Some 
groups are misrecognised through presentations that deviate 
substantially from their own perspectives. At the same time, 
powerful actors influence discourses and related policies and 
practices according to their own interests.
While marginalised and subaltern groups often suffer from 
misrecognition including being ignored, the flip side of this 
process occurs when powerful interests manage to render their 
own power invisible in leading climate discourses from which 
they benefit. Hence, justice and injustice are closely associated 
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with power. While some groups control power resources to follow 
their interests, others do not, and therefore experience injustice 
(Benjaminsen and Svarstad 2021).
We substantiate these arguments through the discussion of three 
examples – the first two are about large-scale climate mitigation 
projects, and the latter relates more to broader discourse 
formation.
The first example is about carbon removal through interventions 
such as reducing emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation (REDD) in developing countries. This is an approach 
that is claimed by its supporters to provide cost-effective climate 
mitigation, but such estimations neglect the livelihood costs of 
forest-adjacent communities that lose access to forest resources. 
Misrecognition of subaltern livelihoods through REDD should 
be seen in association with the exercise of discursive power by 
fossil-fuel interests in the global North.
The second example is the Great Green Wall project in the Sahel, 
which is based on a top-down technical approach, initiated 
by a few African presidents and funded by Western and United 
Nations (UN) agencies. This project is presented as a solution both 
to stop desertification, to mitigate climate change, and to reduce 
insecurity and conflicts in the Sahel. While providing a green 
image to its donors, the project neglects the needs of Sahelian 
pastoralists who are most severely affected by its implementation.
The third example is taken from the debate over whether the 
Syria conflict was partly triggered by climate-induced drought. 
Proponents of this argument refer to a narrative that views 
drought as a ‘threat multiplier’, and the Syrian war as a typical 
example of a positive correlation between climate change and 
conflict. Interviews with displaced Syrians reveal, however, a 
mismatch between this narrative and their own. To them, claiming 
that climate change played a significant role in triggering their 
revolution and later, war, obscures and misrecognises more 
important causes and undermines their agency as political actors.
Hence, we argue first for the need to focus on recognition of 
specific groups that are affected by climate discourses and 
associated policies, and second, we focus on how powerful 
actors and institutions ignore or misrecognise these groups when 
producing discourses and policies. Finally, besides the ongoing 
injustice experienced by affected groups today, climate injustice 
may also affect future generations by deviating from urgent 
action to reduce climate emissions.
2 Recognition as climate justice
The conception of recognition in justice theory has in particular 
been inspired by the work of political philosophers Nancy Fraser 
and Axel Honneth (Fraser and Honneth 2003). Fraser (2000) 
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connects recognition to social status and sees misrecognition 
as the institutionalisation of social subordination. Such 
misrecognition may take place in different ways, for example, 
through cultural domination, non-recognition (or lack of 
recognition), or disrespect. Misrecognition may be connected to 
social categories such as gender, race, religion, or ethnicity.
Fraser sees recognition and distribution as two parallel 
dimensions of justice. This is in disagreement with Honneth who 
argues that recognition is the fundamental and overarching 
category of justice, which means that questions of distribution 
and redistribution are derived from recognition (Fraser and 
Honneth 2003). However, to Fraser, ‘not all maldistribution is a 
by-product of misrecognition’ (Fraser and Honneth 2003: 35). The 
injustice and maldistribution produced by speculative capitalism 
may not necessarily be linked to misrecognition, she argues.1 
We agree that sometimes injustice has other causes than social 
status and recognition. However, in policy formulation, such as in 
climate policies, we would argue that recognition may tend to 
constitute an overarching dimension of justice.
Without some form of recognition, it is unlikely that a group 
of people will benefit from distributive or procedural justice. 
Recognition concerns who is given respect (or not) and whose 
interests, values, and views are recognised and taken into 
account. In the context of climate change, recognition may be 
seen as referring in particular to whose knowledge, interests, 
priorities, and livelihoods are considered valuable in social 
constructions such as leading discourses and narratives, as well 
as in politics and practice.
While Fraser tends to focus on legal or formal recognition primarily 
through state institutions, Honneth conceives recognition as 
containing two dimensions – legal recognition in terms of formal 
rights and intersubjective recognition consisting of solidarity 
and love (Fraser 2018). In climate discourse, policy, and practice, 
misrecognition may be linked to both lack of formal rights as well 
as lack of solidarity with marginalised peoples among powerful 
actors and policymakers.
In discussing misrecognition, Fraser (2009) develops further 
Hannah Arendt’s concept of ‘misframing’ (Arendt 1973). This 
concept refers to who has the right to have rights and the fact 
that some people become non-persons with respect to justice. 
While those who suffer may become objects of charity, they 
remain without any formal rights to justice. Such misframings 
may shield powerful states and transnational companies from 
the reach of justice, and it may be seen as the defining injustice 
of a globalising age, according to Fraser (2009). This politics of 
framing, which refers to who counts as an object of justice, makes 
invisible both the subaltern groups who suffer from injustice as 
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well as the power of countries, institutions, or companies who are 
at the source of this injustice.
However, while both Arendt and Fraser focus on formal justice, 
we think this notion of misframing can be extended also to 
intersubjective justice. Marginalised people are made invisible not 
only as legal objects of justice, but also in leading discourses and 
practices as actors in their own right. Their interests, priorities, and 
livelihoods are neglected. They are therefore not only outside the 
realm of formal justice, but are also neglected and misrecognised 
discursively, which reflects a non-formal type of misrecognition 
that may be seen as lack of solidarity.
In the rest of this article, we discuss three examples through the 
lens of not only formal (mis)recognition, but also intersubjective 
forms expressed through discursive (mis)recognition.
3 Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation 
(REDD)
REDD emerged in the 2000s. By 2015–16, countries mainly in the 
global North had spent more than US$10bn on this programme 
(Angelsen et al. 2017), and with implementation in at least 
69 countries in the global South (Asiyanbi and Lund 2020). A plus 
sign has been added (REDD+) to indicate that apart from targets 
of climate mitigation, the programme seeks to include community 
benefits. Norway is by far a leading funder as well as a central 
promoter of REDD+, and later in this section we present an 
example of a Norwegian-funded REDD+ intervention in Tanzania.
The introduction of REDD+ was based on claims of cost-effective 
climate mitigation. For Norway, REDD+ might be seen as 
cost-effective in comparison to the cost of reducing climate 
emissions by, for instance, leaving Norway’s petroleum resources 
in the ground. However, continued emissions from fossil fuel 
can be seen as contrary to climate justice in time and space 
when they take place in ways that are negative to people who 
live in poverty, such as when the livelihoods of forest-adjacent 
communities are undermined without proper compensation 
(Svarstad 2021).
Interventions financed by REDD+ have taken place and are still 
going on covering vast areas in the global South, affecting an 
unknown number of local communities and people. However, 
research reveals serious problems with this programme (see, for 
example, Asiyanbi 2016; Asiyanbi and Lund 2020; Chomba et al. 
2016; Krause, Collen and Nicholas 2013; Pasgaard and Chea 2013; 
Svarstad and Benjaminsen 2017).
We here concentrate on findings of a case studied over several 
years that examined the social implications of a REDD+ pilot 
project in Tanzania (Svarstad and Benjaminsen 2017). At project 
start in 2010, the area was characterised by widespread poverty 
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amongst 62,000 agro-pastoral smallholders in 21 villages 
surrounding a forest ridge. Twenty-eight per cent of the 
inhabitants were estimated to live in deep poverty with an 
income of less than one dollar a day, and a large part of the rest 
of the population was also considered to be poor (Mung’ong’o 
et al. 2011).
The project introduced a strict regime of forest conservation, with 
limitations in the use of forest resources for daily livelihood means 
such as firewood and grazing. The main purpose was to reserve 
the forest for climate mitigation. Funding came from the Foreign 
Ministry of Norway during 2010–14, and the project was facilitated 
by the environmental non-governmental organisation (NGO) 
African Wildlife Foundation (AWF). During the project period, 
both donor and facilitator presented this project as particularly 
successful and in line with a win–win scenario involving climate 
mitigation and conservation as well as benefits that not only 
compensated villagers for the forest closure, but also contributed 
to poverty reduction (Royal Norwegian Embassy 2012, 2014).
Counter to this, Svarstad and Benjaminsen (2017) found that three 
overlapping groups were adversely affected by the restrictions 
that the project made on forest use. First, people living close 
to the forest and without alternative forests nearby tended 
to be more seriously affected than others. Second, villagers 
with relatively small farms or without farmland at all were more 
affected than others. This is because many villagers who lack 
sufficient farmland depend more on forest resources to sustain 
a living, for instance, by charcoal production. Third, women 
tended to be more affected than men, because of their roles in 
the gendered division of labour, and particularly with collecting 
firewood for domestic purposes.
The planned benefits from the project can be divided into 
long-term and short-term benefits (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and AWF 2009). The long-term benefits should come from 
selling carbon credits in international carbon markets. However, 
after the project was finished, AWF finally admitted that the 
efforts to obtain certification for this project had failed.
The short-term benefits were planned to come from support to 
alternative livelihoods such as intensifying agricultural production, 
planting trees, and producing ‘sustainable charcoal’ on the 
smallholders’ own plots. Despite repeated presentations of the 
great success of the project components and particularly of 
enhancing agricultural output, these claims were found to be 
unsubstantiated (Svarstad and Benjaminsen 2017).
All in all, this is a case of REDD+ that was celebrated by both the 
donor and the facilitating NGO as a great win–win, although 
independent and critical research reveals a clear case of climate 
injustice. People living in poverty were negatively affected, and 
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these are people who probably have some of the lowest climate 
footprints in the world. The injustice was brought on them by the 
Government of Norway, a country with high climate emissions 
directly, as well as indirectly from benefiting economically from 
fossil-fuel export.
How was this possible? This outcome can be explained by the 
lack of two types of recognition. First, there is a lack of formal 
recognition. Actors behind REDD+ often refer to safeguards 
established by the UN to avoid the negative consequences of 
REDD+ (UN-REDD Programme 2012). However, these are vague 
and unbinding formulations and do not provide vulnerable 
people with formal rights to avoid negative impacts.
Second, the livelihoods and interests of people who are 
negatively affected by REDD+ are not discursively recognised 
and made visible in the sense that there is hardly any knowledge 
about them in donor countries, such as Norway. Therefore, the 
victims of climate injustice through REDD+ are not heard or seen, 
and instead their misrecognition in the leading discourse in 
Norway about REDD+ as a win–win is seldom contested. Thus, 
there are hardly any voices in a country such as Norway to speak 
up for victims of REDD+. There are several reasons for this. One 
reason is that nearly all political parties as well as environmental 
and solidarity organisations in Norway supported the idea of 
a large Norwegian REDD+ programme from the beginning, 
and they have later found it to be in their self-interest to refrain 
from criticising REDD+. Today, there is a political consensus to 
continue the Norwegian REDD+ programme until at least 2030. 
Other reasons are the lack of independent and critical research 
on Norwegian-funded initiatives as well as lack of critical media 
coverage.
Thus, the Norwegian government handles REDD+ in a technical 
manner along with a simple win–win narrative and can continue 
to do so without much attention. The silent continuation of REDD+ 
is also convenient for powerful interests behind the petroleum 
industry and other high emission activities, because REDD+ is 
presented as a major climate measure without the need for costly 
changes within Norway.
4 The Great Green Wall in the Sahel
The Great Green Wall (GGW) is planned as a 15km-wide wall of 
trees over a stretch of 8,000km, from Senegal to Djibouti. The 
project was conceived in 2005 by a group of African heads of 
state including, in particular, the former president of Senegal, 
Abdoulaye Wade, former president of Nigeria, Olesegun 
Obasanjo, and former leader of Libya, Mouammar Gaddafi. It was 
formally approved by the African Union as a Pan-African project 
in 2007, and it has later received financial support from the Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, World Bank, 
Global Environment Facility, European Union, and International 
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Union for Conservation of Nature (UNCCD 2020). At the climate 
summit in Paris in December 2015, donors pledged a total of 
US$4bn to the project, but by 2020, the project had received 
merely US$870m of this promised funding (UNCCD 2020).
The aims of the GGW are to restore 100m hectares of degraded 
land, create 10m jobs, and sequestrate 250m tonnes of carbon by 
2030. It is believed that these results will furthermore bring down 
recruitment to jihadist insurgency and reduce migration from the 
Sahel to Europe (Great Green Wall 2021).
Due to the project being championed by former president Wade, 
Senegal is without doubt the leading country in implementing 
the GGW where most of the land restoration has taken place 
(leading some to name it ‘the great Senegalese wall’). So far, 
there has been minimal project activity in the other Sahelian 
countries (Magrin and Mugelé 2020). An evaluation initiated 
by the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification 
(UNCCD) concluded that by 2020, only 4 per cent of the planned 
area had been afforested. This meagre result is due to a general 
lack of enthusiasm among those Sahelian governments occupied 
with more pressing issues, as well as among donors who see the 
project as too risky amidst the security situation in the region 
(Mugelé 2018; Magrin and Mugelé 2020).
The fact that the Sahel has been greening following increased 
rainfall the last few decades (see, for example, Benjaminsen and 
Hiernaux 2019) may have led to additional hesitation among 
donors. Moreover, survival rates of tree seedlings in the Sahel 
are low unless they are actively watered by hand. According to 
Yeo (2018), the survival rate in the GGW plantations in Senegal 
has been 45 per cent following intensive watering and protection 
of the seedlings.
The documented greening is also said to have recently changed 
the approach of the project from tree planting ‘to become 
a mosaic of resilient land use systems with the capacity to 
adapt to uncertainty and climatic extremes’ (UNCCD 2020: 29). 
However, this change of approach is not apparent in the project’s 
self-presentation on its website, which is still focused on creating 
an 8,000km wall of trees to stop the southward movement of the 
Sahara and, through this afforestation, to sequestrate a large 
amount of carbon.
The project activities have so far been dominated by a technical 
and top-down approach focused on tree planting. The project 
also suffers from lacking local involvement and participation 
(Mugelé 2018; Magrin and Mugelé 2020). Since the project is 
focused on the zone between 100mm and 400mm of annual 
rainfall, which is marginal for dryland farming, the local population 
consists primarily of pastoralists.
 IDS Bulletin Online First ‘Reframing Climate and Environmental Justice’
Institute of Development Studies | bulletin.ids.ac.uk
Pastoralism has, however, not been taken into account in the 
design, planning, and implementation of the GGW (Mugelé 2018). 
In the Ferlo region in Senegal, where a large proportion of project 
activities have taken place, and where there is a centuries’ long 
history of pastoral use, the pastoral dependence on access to 
land is not only neglected by the project, but pastoralism is also 
seen as an obstacle to the afforestation that project success is 
measured by. Through totally ignoring the needs of pastoralists 
and their livestock, the GGW exacerbates existing misrecognition 
of pastoralists in the form of lack of both formal and discursive 
recognition.
First, this misrecognition manifests in the blocking of pastoral 
mobility through enclosures of afforested areas. Second, it leads 
to loss of grazing areas that the pastoral system depends on, 
and third, the afforested areas and vegetable production within 
these areas compete with livestock for water. Ironically, this means 
that the GGW results in natural resource scarcity for the local 
population in the Ferlo, the Fulani pastoralists (Mugelé 2018).
The top-down approach of the project is also reinforced by the 
fact that it is implemented by the Water and Forest Department 
(Le Service des Eaux et Forêts), which is an old colonial institution 
with a para-military tradition of being an armed forest police 
(Benjaminsen 2000; Ribot 2001). In the central project area in the 
Ferlo region, there are eight state forest agents. None of them 
are from the region and none of them are Fulani (Mugelé 2018). 
These foresters are given the task of producing success measured 
by the number of trees planted and the area afforested 
(Mugelé 2018).
Traditional leaders and the elected leaders of local communes 
are also largely neglected by the project. They are not consulted 
and are merely told to comply with the decisions made by the 
project foresters pertaining, for instance, to the location of areas 
to be afforested. In addition, the foresters give local people 
fines for illegal use of tree products and when livestock manage 
to enter afforestation areas (Mugelé 2018). This is possible 
because the state formally owns all rural land in the Sahel 
(except individually titled land which is only a small percentage) 
(Benjaminsen et al. 2009), and pastoral custom is generally 
not recognised by state legislation or policies (Thébaud and 
Batterbury 2001). Forest legislation is strict with few local rights of 
access to forest products and with fines for infraction of rules. This 
has given state foresters considerable power compared to local 
populations (Benjaminsen 2000; Ribot 2001; Gautier et al. 2013).
This top-down and technical approach to forest management 
has a history dating back to the 1930s in the Sahel (Benjaminsen 
2000), and rather than reducing conflicts, it risks further increasing 
tensions between pastoralists and state institutions. This tension 
is behind the recruitment of pastoralists to armed groups labelled 
Benjaminsen, Svarstad and Shaw of Tordarroch Recognising Recognition in Climate Justice 
IDS Bulletin Online First ‘Reframing Climate and Environmental Justice’
‘jihadist’ (Benjaminsen and Ba 2019, 2021) and may therefore 
in the long run contribute to the opposite result of what the 
project intends.
The misrecognition of Sahelian pastoralists following this project 
as well as generally, is both formal in terms of lack of rights as 
well as discursive. The GGW is, to a large extent, conceived as a 
climate mitigation project, which led to massive donor interest at 
the Paris Climate Conference. The resulting misframing has made 
the victims of the initiative invisible; for instance, on the website of 
the GGW and in other project presentations.
When there is such straightforward misrecognition of the local 
population, in this case pastoralists in the Sahel, there is a clear 
risk that climate mitigation may lead not only to a failed climate 
project, but also to adverse results such as increased local 
natural resource scarcity and increased resistance to the state, 
which might ultimately exacerbate conflict levels.
5 Climate as a conflict trigger in Syria?
Another case of climate misrecognition is found in the Syria–
climate–conflict thesis. Since 2012, a narrative arguing that the 
war in Syria was partly climate induced, has journeyed from 
a handful of academic studies to grey literature and popular 
media. This has made the Syrian conflict one of the primary 
contemporary examples of climate–conflict narratives (Daoudy 
2020). The main tenets of the Syria–climate–conflict thesis are 
that anthropogenic drought drove agricultural collapse and 
mass migration from Syria’s northeast Jazira region, eventually 
leading to civil unrest in the urban centres that received migrants 
from the drought. Proponents of the thesis argue that the Syria 
case shows how climate change threatens to exacerbate 
socioeconomic conditions in fragile states to the extent that it 
increases the likelihood of conflict in certain contexts. None of 
the thesis’ proponents argue that environmental factors alone 
triggered Syria’s war, but at the very least, that they played an 
important role.
During the run-up to the 2015 Paris Climate Conference, mainly 
three peer-reviewed articles (Gleick 2014; Kelley et al. 2015; 
Werrell, Femia and Sternberg 2015) provided the empirical 
evidence for the thesis (Selby et al. 2017). The media and public 
figures picked up these three articles, fuelling leading discourse 
on what conflictual scenarios might await in a warmer world, with 
Syria as its empirical backing. Obama, Prince Charles, and Ban 
Ki-moon are a select few of those who have voiced their support 
of the theory that climate change played a significant role in 
triggering the Syrian war (Selby 2018). This is the case, despite 
numerous studies critical of the thesis’ underpinning evidence 
(e.g. Selby et al. 2017), its potential to underplay more important 
conflict triggers (e.g. de Châtel 2014), and narrow definition of 
environmental security (e.g. Daoudy 2020).
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Within the set of three studies supporting the Syria–climate–
conflict thesis, there is only a single mention of testimony from 
Syrians (Selby et al. 2017). The quote (in Kelley et al. 2015) from a 
displaced Syrian farmer is taken from a piece by New York Times 
journalist Thomas Friedman. For years, the Syria–climate–conflict 
thesis gained traction in public discourse with very scant input 
from the people who experienced the war and its consequences 
first hand.
Selby et al. (2017) raised this concern in a debate over the 
climate–conflict link in Syria that took place in Political 
Geography. Peter Gleick, water scholar and proponent of the 
thesis, responded to the critique by stating that interviews 
with displaced Syrians are ‘interesting, but have no validity 
scientifically’ (Gleick 2017: 249). Shaw of Tordarroch (2021) 
challenged this viewpoint by arguing the empirical value of 
qualitative inputs and not least, the importance of recognition 
in debates over proposed climate–conflict links. Her study 
concentrated on Syrian reactions, experiences, and perceptions 
surrounding the climate–conflict nexus and its application to the 
Syrian war.
A total of 79 Syrian participants took part across four qualitative 
focus group discussions and 15 semi-structured interviews. The 
study was conducted in the midst of the Covid-19 pandemic, thus 
all data collection sessions were carried out on the Zoom video 
conferencing platform, with all interview guides approved by the 
Norwegian Centre for Research Data. Sixty of the participants 
were refugees living in Turkish Sanliurfa, Gaziantep, and Kilis. 
Four were internally displaced persons living in the Syrian city of 
Jarabulus and the remaining 15 participants had been displaced 
from Syria and were now living in Norway. The entire sample 
lived in Syria between at least 2005 and 2011, and all considered 
themselves Syrian although a small number of participants were 
originally Palestinian (four) and Kurdish (two).
The data collection sessions were initiated by an unbiased 
explanation of the Syria–climate–conflict thesis by the 
interviewer, in an intelligible fashion that was not overly academic. 
The intent throughout the study was for the researcher to remain 
open to any potential findings.
Overall, Syrian participants were strongly disagreeable to the 
thesis and in several cases took offence to the suggestion 
that their revolution and war had a natural cause (Shaw of 
Tordarroch 2021). To them, the Syria–climate–conflict thesis fails 
to acknowledge the long-enduring plights of many Syrians, and 
that the events that unravelled in 2011 were driven by the popular 
desire to bring freedom, democracy, and reformation to Syria.
A majority of participants acknowledged the presence of drought 
and internal migration in Syria, but none associated these 
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phenomena with the Syrian conflict. In fact, most supported 
a reverse sequence of the climate–conflict nexus, relaying 
concern over climatic effects of conflict rather than the other 
way around. The thesis was, in the view of several participants, 
an embodiment of the West’s current preoccupation with climate 
change rather than an attempt to explain the war’s causes or 
seek out a remedy for it.
The study found that Syrian participants express feeling persistent 
discursive misrecognition in the leading discourse about the 
Syrian conflict. As the previously quoted statement by Gleick 
illustrates, Syrian voices are not only excluded in the debate, 
but are also disregarded on the basis of not being seen as 
scientifically valuable. Such misrecognition constitutes a form 
of disrespect and lack of solidarity in which Syrian experiences, 
views, and interests are not considered knowledge on a par with 
Western or scientific knowledge. In this case, the misrecognised 
are not directly affected by climate or mitigation policies, but 
rather by dominating discourse in which climate is centre-stage.
Syrians in this study felt angered by the persistent focus on 
conflict triggers ten years on from the conflict’s inception, 
instead of navigating policy towards instilling peace. In their 
view, the climate–conflict discourse on Syria presents a form 
of misrecognition by closing them out of the conversation and 
promoting the values, interests, and worldviews of powerful actors 
such as the West or Assad regime, rather than the millions of 
Syrians whose lives are eternally affected by the still ongoing war 
in Syria.
6 Conclusions
We argue in this article that recognition should be given more 
attention as an aspect of climate justice, and that misrecognition 
is a key source of climate injustice. Discussing three examples, we 
distinguish between formal and discursive (mis)recognition.
Formal recognition of affected people exists if policy or laws 
protect their rights to maintain basic needs and livelihoods, 
following the implementation of climate mitigation measures. 
In the case of REDD+, we showed how the UN have established 
safeguards to avoid negative consequences of REDD+, but these 
are not strong enough to protect poor and vulnerable people 
from the negative impacts of REDD+ interventions. Similarly, the 
GGW in the Sahel is implemented without involving the affected 
pastoralists. This project is also managed by an institution with a 
history of top-down approaches dating back to colonial times. 
In this institutional context, pastoralists have been portrayed as 
destroyers of the environment and have not been granted any 
formal land-use rights.
Leading discourses and narratives influence policies and 
practices. There is discursive recognition if a leading discourse 
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or narrative takes account of the interests and livelihoods of the 
communities or peoples that will be affected by an initiative, 
and the presentation is in line with the senses of justice of these 
groups (Svarstad and Benjaminsen 2020). In the REDD+ case 
in Tanzania, a win–win narrative was produced by the actors 
behind the intervention, despite poor and vulnerable people 
being affected negatively. A win–win discourse on REDD+ remains 
hegemonic in policymaking, although an increasing body of 
research demonstrates how the programme has adverse effects 
on communities living in or close to forests and their livelihoods.
In a similar vein, pastoralists in the Sahel remain discursively 
invisible; for instance, on the website of the GGW and in other 
project presentations. The discursive and financial power of 
UN organisations, the World Bank and the European Union 
produces a framing about fighting desertification and reducing 
out-migration and violent conflicts in the Sahel through tree 
planting, which lacks any sound support in research or in the 
realities on the ground.
Misframing in climate change discourses disguises the interests 
of powerful actors and shields them from any accountability. 
In addition, the interests, agency, and livelihoods of subaltern 
groups are made invisible. Not only do they become non-persons 
in terms of formal justice, but also in discourse and practice they 
are disregarded as actors in their own right. They miss out on 
benefiting from legal justice, but also as they remain invisible, 
they are not subject to solidarity as a form of intersubjective 
recognition.
This rendering invisible is evident in all three cases discussed 
including the portrayal of the Syrian war as partly triggered by 
climate change. The displaced Syrians interviewed were largely 
unaware of this discursive misrecognition. They expressed the 
opinion that the leading discourse on the conflict departs from 
their own views and experience. Syrian voices have largely been 
neglected in the Syria–climate–conflict debate, despite their 
indisputable insight into why Syria descended into war, and 
their stake in how the rest of the world discursively understands 
the conflict. The environment-centric explanation of the Syrian 
war presented in the leading discourse impedes accurate and 
nuanced analyses, specifying responsibility for past and future 
action and opportunities to elaborate peaceful solutions.
Through the three examples, this article has shown how poor and 
vulnerable groups face climate injustice due to misrecognition. 
This immediately causes situations of spatial climate injustice. At 
the same time, it also contributes to temporal climate injustice 
for future generations by deviating from urgent action to reduce 
global warming.
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